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ENDANGERED PRECEDENT: 
INTERPRETING AGENCY ACTION AND 
THE DUTY TO CONSULT UNDER SECTION 
7 OF THE ESA IN LIGHT OF KARUK 
Jeffrey Pike* 
Abstract: Following the designation of the West Coast coho salmon as a 
threatened species under the Endangered Species Act, and the ensuing 
designation of the Klamath River system in the Pacific Northwest as criti-
cal habitat for the species, the indigenous Karuk Tribe challenged the 
U.S. Forest Service’s mining permit approval practices in Karuk Tribe of 
California v. U.S. Forest Service. Under Section 7 of the ESA, an agency must 
consult with one of two outside resources in instances where the agency’s 
actions “may affect” an endangered population. In reversing the district 
court’s denial of summary judgment on the Tribe’s ESA claim, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the Forest Service’s approval of mining applications 
without consultation constituted discretionary agency action that may af-
fect the region’s coho salmon population. This Comment argues that this 
broad interpretation of agency action accurately reflects Section 7’s re-
quirements. Furthermore, because this standard is clear, courts should 
apply this broad interpretation in future cases to avoid inconsistency and 
protect the environment in accord with congressional intent. 
Introduction 
 In January of 1848, a construction work crew led by James Mar-
shall was stationed in Coloma, California.1 A skilled carpenter, Marshall 
contracted with John Sutter to build a sawmill on the American River.2 
It was at this location that on January 24, 1848 Marshall spotted the first 
tiny flecks of metal that would trigger the California Gold Rush of 1849 
and forever change the West.3 Approximately eighty thousand immi-
grants left their homes in 1849 for California, and by the 1850s, miners 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2012–2013. 
1 The California Gold Rush, Cal. Nat. Resources Agency, http://ceres.ca.gov/ceres/ 
calweb/geology/goldrush.html (last visited July 11, 2013). 
2 California Gold Discovery, Coloma-Lotus Chamber of Comm., http://www.coloma. 
com/california-gold-discovery (last visited July 11, 2013). 
3 Id. 
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from around the world had travelled to the West in the hopes of strik-
ing it rich.4 Over time, however, as profits began to subside, the viability 
of a career in mining deteriorated.5 
 Nevertheless, recreational miners today continue to spend week-
ends forging the rivers of California and the Pacific Northwest for trac-
es of gold.6 One such river system is the Klamath, which spans 250 miles 
from southeastern Oregon to northern California.7 The river passes 
through the Six Rivers and Klamath National Forests in northern Cali-
fornia, home to the Karuk Tribe (“Tribe”).8 
 An indigenous population that has inhabited the region for gen-
erations, the Tribe is dependent on the natural resources of the Kla-
math River Valley.9 Specifically, the Tribe relies on the coho salmon for 
subsistence, cultural, economic, and religious purposes.10 A species of 
Pacific salmon, the anadromous West Coast coho salmon leave freshwa-
ter in the spring and re-enter freshwater from September to November 
to spawn in small streams with stable gravels.11 In 1997, the National Ma-
rine Fisheries Service (NMFS) listed coho salmon were listed as “threat-
ened” under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).12 As a result, the NMFS 
designated the Klamath River system as critical habitat for the species in 
1999.13 As of 2011, the Klamath River Basin’s coho salmon population 
                                                                                                                      
4 See id. 
5 See Carl J. Meyer, Comment, The 1872 Mining Law: Historical Origins of the Discovery 
Rule, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 624, 639 (1986). Gold production in the U.S. reached a high of 
$65 million in 1853, but dropped to $39.2 million in 1862. Id. 
6 Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2012). 
7 Id.; The Klamath River, Am. Rivers, http://www.americanrivers.org/assets/pdfs/dam-
removal-docs/Klamath_Fact_Sheet8394.pdf (last visited July 11, 2013). 
8 Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1011. Having gained federal recognition in 1979, the Tribe had an 
enrollment of 3620 members in 2011. Shelby King, The Tribes of the Klamath River, Herald 
and News (Oregon) (Mar. 8, 2012, 11:58 AM), http://www.heraldandnews.com/article_ 
6e3cb47a-5cbe-11e1-bd35-001871e3ce6c.html. 
9 Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1011. 
10 Id.; Glen Spain, Dams, Water Reforms, and Endangered Species in the Klamath Basin, 22 J. 
Envtl. L. & Litig. 49, 51 (2007). 
11 Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Ass’n, Updated Status of Federally Listed 
ESUs of West Coast Salmon and Steelhead 311 (Thomas P. Good et al. eds., June 2005), 
available at http://www.nwfsc.noaa.gov/assets/25/6226_08302005_132955_brttechmemo66 
final2.pdf; see NEFSC Fish FAQ, NOAA Fisheries Serv.: Ne. Fisheries Sci. Ctr., http://www. 
nefsc.noaa.gov/faq/fishfaq1a.html (last modified June 16, 2011). 
12 Endangered and Threatened Species, Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/ 
Northern California Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 24,588, 24,588 (May 6, 1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227). 
13 Designated Critical Habitat; Central California Coast and Southern Oregon/ 
Northern California Coasts Coho Salmon, 64 Fed. Reg. 24,049, 24,049 (May 5, 1999) (cod-
ified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 226). 
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was considered to be at a substantial risk of extinction with run numbers 
at less than one percent of their historical average.14 
 In response to the threat of extinction arguably caused in part by 
the recreational mining activities in the Klamath River system, petition-
ers in Karuk Tribe of California v. U.S. Forest Service challenged the U.S. 
Forest Service’s (“Forest Service”) approval of four Notices of Intent 
(NOI) for proposed mining activities in the Klamath River system un-
der Section 7 of the ESA.15 Section 7 requires that agencies consult with 
one of two outside resources in instances where that agency’s actions 
“may affect” an endangered population.16 
 In Karuk, the court held that the Forest Service’s approval of the 
NOIs constituted discretionary agency action that “may affect” the for-
est system’s coho salmon population.17 In so doing, the majority con-
strained the Forest Service by requiring the park’s District Rangers to 
consult with outside wildlife experts.18 The line between what consti-
tutes informal advice that would not require consultation and affirma-
tive authorization requiring consultation, however, is often blurred and 
poorly defined.19 This Comment argues that broadly interpreting agen-
cy action, as done in Karuk, provides an accurate reflection of Section 7 
of the ESA.20 Furthermore, because this standard is clear, the Karuk 
court’s broad interpretation should be applied in future cases to avoid 
inconsistency and to protect the environment in accord with congres-
sional intent.21 
                                                                                                                      
14 Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Klamath River Basin: 2011 Report to Congress 5 , 
available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/species/klamathriverbasin2011.pdf; Bring the 
Salmon Home, Karuk Tribe, http://www.karuk.us/press/bring_salmon_home.php (last vis-
ited Feb. 24, 2013). 
15 Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1016. 
16 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006); Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1020 (“Section 7 imposes on all 
agencies a duty to consult . . . before engaging in any discretionary action that may affect a 
listed species or critical habitat.”). 
17 681 F.3d at 1027, 1029. 
18 See id. 
19 Compare Natural Res. Def. Council v. Salazar, 686 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(finding U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s renewal of water contracts was not discretionary 
agency action subject to Section 7 of the ESA), with Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 
146 F.3d 1118, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s renewal of 
water contracts was discretionary agency action subject to Section 7 of the ESA). 
20 See 681 F.3d at 1020; see also Holly Doremus, Ninth Circuit Corrects Itself on Gold Mining 
and the ESA, Legal Planet ( June 3, 2012), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2012/06/ 
03/ninth-circuit-corrects-itself-on-gold-mining-and-the-esa/. 
21 See 681 F.3d at 1030. 
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I. Facts and Procedural History 
 Since the passage of the General Mining Law of 1872, Congress 
has provided the public with a statutory right to enter public land for 
the purposes of mining and prospecting, subject to limitations by the 
Secretary of Agriculture and local authorities.22 In an effort to mini-
mize the environmental impact of this statutory right, the Forest Ser-
vice promulgated revised regulations in 1974.23 Depending on the po-
tential impact of the proposed activity, the regulations require a miner 
to file one of two documents with the Forest Service: a NOI or a Plan of 
Operations (“Plan”).24 A NOI only requires the miner declare basic in-
formation “sufficient to identify the area involved, the nature of the 
proposed operations, the route of access to the area of operations, and 
the method of transport.”25 In contrast, a Plan more exhaustively re-
quires detailed information describing the mining location, size of min-
ing areas, and more involved precautionary details concerning the 
“measures to be taken to meet the requirements for environmental 
protection.”26 It is thus advantageous to the miner to avoid the necessity 
of a Plan if it is possible for a NOI to suffice.27 
 Though commercial gold mining involving hydraulic pumps was 
banned over a century ago, in part because of the adverse environ-
mental impact, recreational miners in the Klamath River Valley con-
                                                                                                                      
22 See 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2006). Congress has expanded the General Mining Law of 1872, 
most notably by the Organic Administration Act of 1897 and by 1974 regulations modify-
ing the right to mine areas under Forest Service control. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 482, 551 (2006); 
36 C.F.R. § 228.1 (2011); National Forests Surface use Under U.S. Mining Laws, 39 Fed. 
Reg. 31,317, 31,317 (Aug. 28, 1974) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 251). 
23 See National Forests Surface use Under U.S. Mining Laws, 39 Fed. Reg. at 31,317. 
24 See id. at 31,318. 
25 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a). 
26 See id. § 228.4(c)(3). 
27 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1013. To determine which document is required, the Forest 
Service regulations establish three categories of mining. Id. at 1012. The first category, de-
minimus mining activities, include those activities that “will not cause” significant distur-
bance of surface resources. 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a)(1)(v). Miners who propose activities that 
will not cause a significant disturbance can proceed without authorization from, or notice 
to, the Forest Service. See id. In the second category, activities that “might cause” significant 
disturbance of surface resources, the Forest Service requires miners to file an NOI. Id. 
§ 228.4(a). After submission of the NOI, the District Ranger must determine within fifteen 
days whether the proposed activity “will likely cause” significant disturbance of surface 
resources, in which case a Plan will be required. Id. § 228.4(a)(2). In the third category, 
activities that “will likely cause” significant disturbance of surface resources, the miner 
must automatically submit a Plan. Id. § 228.4(a)(3). 
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tinue to conduct small-scale mining operations in one of three forms.28 
The most invasive form, mechanical “suction dredging,” occurs within 
the stream itself.29 Gasoline-powered engines utilize flexible intake 
hoses to extract water and sediment from the stream.30 The material is 
deposited into a floating sluice box with the excess discharged into a 
tailings pile either in the stream itself or on the nearby bank.31 
 Prior to the 2004 mining season, members of the Karuk Tribe 
concerned about the impact of mechanical suction dredge mining on 
the coho salmon population in the Klamath River system began talks 
with the Forest Service.32 After meeting with the various affected parties 
and Forest Service biologists, the District Ranger for the Happy Camp 
District of the Klamath National Forest identified three primary areas 
of concern: (1) protection of the cold water areas in the Klamath River; 
(2) the magnitude of dredge activities; and (3) the stability of spawning 
gravels.33 
 In 2005, the Tribe requested declaratory and injunctive relief in 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for al-
leged violations of the ESA by the Forest Service’s approval of four 
NOIs in the Happy Camp District without prior consultation with fed-
eral wildlife agencies during the 2004 mining season.34 The first chal-
lenged NOI involved the New 49ers, a recreational mining company 
that owned and leased various claims throughout the Klamath and Six 
Rivers National Forests.35 The other three challenged NOIs involved 
individual miners.36 All four of the challenged NOIs involved suction 
dredge mining.37 
 The Tribe alleged that by issuing the permits without consultation, 
the Forest Service violated its statutory duty under Section 7 of the ESA 
                                                                                                                      
28 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1011–12. In conformance with tradition, some recreational 
miners continue to “pan” for gold. Id. at 1012. Pan miners sift sand, gravel, and debris 
manually in search of gold, an activity that imparts virtually no adverse impact on the sur-
rounding ecosystem. See id. Miners also engage in “motorized sluicing” whereby rocks, 
gravel, and sand are excavated into a sluice box when water is pumped onto the stream 
banks. Id. Gold is captured in the bottom of the device and the remaining material collects 
to form a tailings pile. Id. 
29 See id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 1013. 
33 Id. 
34 Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1012, 1016. 
35 Id. at 1014. 
36 Id. at 1015. 
37 See id. at 1014–15. 
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to protect the coho salmon from harmful mining activities.38 The For-
est Service conceded that the approval of a NOI may affect surface re-
sources and the agency did not consult with either the U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service or the NMFS with regard to any of the four challenged 
NOIs.39 The Forest Service countered, however, that such an argument 
was moot because approving NOIs did not constitute affirmative, dis-
cretionary action, and therefore the agency had no duty to seek consul-
tation.40 
 The district court rejected the Tribe’s motion for summary judg-
ment in July 2005 and ruled against it on all remaining claims.41 In 
2011, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment in holding 
that the approval of proposed activities pursuant to a NOI does not 
constitute agency action.42 Subsequently, the Tribe requested rehear-
ing, which the court granted en banc.43 
II. Legal Background 
  Passed in 1973, Congress designed the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) to protect critical species and their respective habitats.44 Al-
though it might appear that the 1974 U.S. Forest Service regulations 
leave a District Ranger with broad discretion to evaluate mining activi-
ties, Section 7 of the ESA imposes upon federal agencies a “duty to con-
                                                                                                                      
38 Id. at 1012. 
39 Id. at 1015, 1027. 
40 See id. at 1023. Despite argumentation from the miners, the court found that the 
proposed activities met the “low threshold” set by the “may affect” standard. Id. at 1029. 
41 Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1016. All parties stayed briefing on appeal in anticipation of the 
court’s decision regarding a similar claim involving the Siskiyou National Forest in Ore-
gon. Id. at 1016–17; Siskiyou Reg’l Educ. Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., 565 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
42 Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1017. Since the NOIs in question expired on December 31, 2004 
with the end of the 2004 mining season, the appellate court en banc considered whether 
the Tribe’s claims were moot. Id. The court found the claims to be justiciable as “‘capable 
of repetition, yet evading review,’” an exception to the mootness doctrine that applies 
where either full litigation is impossible due to the short duration of the challenged action 
or where there is reasonable expectation that the Forest Service will be subjected to the 
challenged action again. Id. at 1018. Since the Forest Service allows mining activities on a 
seasonal, yearly basis, the court found the challenged NOIs to be too short in duration to 
be fully litigated before their expiration. Id. Furthermore, given the multitude of approved 
NOIs in the region inhabited by the coho salmon, and the potential of similar actions in 
the future, the court found the controversy to be capable of repetition. Id. 
43 See id. at 1017. 
44 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2006); see also ESA Basics, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service 
(Jan. 2013), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/ESA_basics.pdf. 
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sult with either the” U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) or National Ma-
rine Fisheries Service (NMFS) “before engaging in any discretionary 
action that may affect a listed species or critical habitat.”45 In requiring 
the agency to use its legal authority to consult with wildlife experts, the 
ESA aims to “identify reasonable and prudent alternatives that will 
avoid the action’s unfavorable impacts.”46 
 In enacting Section 7 of the ESA, Congress intended that the defi-
nition of agency action be construed broadly.47 The Supreme Court 
first supported this principle in 1978 in the seminal case Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill.48 In Hill, following designation of a small fish species as 
endangered, respondents brought suit to enjoin completion of the Tel-
lico Dam on the Little Tennessee River.49 In response, petitioner 
claimed that the ESA did not apply to the particular project, which was 
over seventy percent complete.50 The Court, in affirming an order en-
joining completion of the dam, discussed Section 7, noting: 
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision 
whose terms were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endan-
gered Species Act. Its very words affirmatively command all 
federal agencies “to insure that actions authorized, funded, or 
carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence” 
of an endangered species or “result in the destruction or mod-
ification of habitat of such species. . . .” This language admits 
of no exception.51 
As is evident, therefore, there must be a finding of “agency action” that 
“may affect” a listed species.52 To evaluate whether an agency has acted 
                                                                                                                      
45 See Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1020 (9th Cir. 2012) (em-
phasis added); Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d 
969, 974 (9th Cir. 2003). Specifically, Section 7(a)(2) instructs: “Each Federal agency shall 
. . . insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not like-
ly to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species 
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species . . . .” 16 
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
46 Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1020; see Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 974; see also ESA Basics, supra 
note 43. 
47 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1020; Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 
1125 (9th Cir. 1998); Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1994). 
48 See 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978). 
49 Id. at 161, 164. 
50 Id. at 165. 
51 Id. at 173. 
52 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1020; 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a) (2006). After a finding of agency 
action, the court will continue to the second step of the analysis to consider whether that 
action “may affect” the listed species or critical habitat and thereby trigger the consultation 
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so as to trigger the requirement, the courts must find that: the agency 
(1) made an affirmative act or authorization;53 and (2) exerted discre-
tionary involvement or control that could benefit the listed species.54 
 The Ninth Circuit has at times broadly interpreted Section 7 of the 
ESA to find sufficient discretionary agency action that may affect a 
listed species.55 In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Houston, environ-
mental groups brought suit against various irrigation and water districts 
alleging that the Bureau of Reclamation (“Bureau”) violated Section 7 
of the ESA when it renewed multiple federal water contracts without 
first seeking formal consultation with the NMFS, thereby potentially 
harming threatened Chinook salmon populations.56 In 1998, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, hold-
ing that negotiating and executing contracts is agency action and there-
fore the Bureau violated the ESA by not consulting with the NMFS.57 
The court noted that though the ESA only applies where there is suffi-
cient agency discretion to act, even if the contract renewals were auto-
matic, the Bureau could alter key terms and therefore retained suffi-
cient discretion.58 
 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that an agency that can 
act to protect an endangered species must seek consultation.59 In 2004, 
in Turtle Island Restoration Network v. National Marine Fisheries Service, the 
court found that the NMFS had sufficient discretion to place condi-
tions on fishing permits to protect local endangered species and there-
                                                                                                                      
requirement. Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1020, 1027. The Secretaries of Commerce and Interior, 
who have the responsibility for administration and enforcement of the ESA, have dele-
gated such to the NMFS with regard to marine species, and to the FWS with regard to ter-
restrial species. Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 973–74. This consultation can be formal or infor-
mal, thereby providing agencies with added flexibility. See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1027. 
Conversely, an agency can avoid the consultation requirement, despite exerting agency 
action with discretion, only if that action will have “no affect” on a listed species or critical 
habitat. Id. 
53 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (“Examples include, but are not limited to: (a) actions in-
tended to conserve listed species or their habitat; (b) the promulgation of regulations; (c) 
the granting of licenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-in-
aid; or (d) actions directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land, water, or air.”). 
54 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1021; see also Turtle Island, 430 F.3d at 974 (noting “the discre-
tionary control retained by the federal agency must have the ability to inure to the benefit 
of a protected species”); Houston, 146 F.3d at 1125–26 (“Where there is no agency discre-
tion to act, the ESA does not apply.”). 
55 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1024; Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 974; Houston, 146 F.3d at 1125. 
56 See 146 F.3d at 1123–1124. 
57 Id. at 1125–26, 1133. 
58 Id. at 1125–26. 
59 Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 977. 
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by triggered the consultation requirement.60 To reach that conclusion, 
the court considered whether the agency could influence a private ac-
tivity to benefit a listed species, not whether it must do so.61 Therefore, 
because the NMFS had the discretion to place conditions on the fishing 
permits, regardless of whether it chose to do so, the ESA required con-
sultation.62 
 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has found no duty to consult where 
an agency has not affirmatively acted.63 In Western Watersheds Project v. 
Matejko, plaintiffs challenged the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) 
decision to not impose water-use conditions on private landowners who 
constructed water diversions on public lands in central Idaho.64 The dis-
trict court broadly interpreted agency action and ruled in favor of plain-
tiffs, finding agency action to include the decision to ignore, or not 
act.65 In reversing the lower court decision in 2006, the Ninth Circuit 
distinguished action from inaction and explained that there must be 
affirmative action to trigger the consultation requirement.66 Since BLM 
did not affirmatively act, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no duty 
to consult.67 
 Similarly, in 1996 in Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the FWS did not affirmatively act when the agency discussed 
proposed cutting and removal of dead, dying, and decayed trees with 
various lumber companies.68 The FWS had co-signed a letter outlining 
procedures for the lumber companies to follow to avoid a take.69 The 
Environmental Protection Information Center sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief, arguing that the FWS had failed to satisfy the consulta-
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. The threatened species included four turtle species and the short-tailed alba-
tross. Id. at 970, 971–72. The court explained, “When the acting agency is . . . the Fisheries 
Service . . . the obligation to consult is not relieved, instead, the agency must consult with-
in its own agency to fulfill its statutory mandate.” Id. at 974. 
61 Id. at 977. 
62 Id. 
63 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Salazar, 686 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding 
that the consultation requirement is not triggered when an agency lacks sufficient discre-
tion to act); W. Watersheds Project v. Matejko, 468 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding 
there is no duty to consult where an agency has not affirmatively acted); Marbled Murrelet 
v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding there is no agency action where the 
agency lacks sufficient discretion). 
64 See 468 F.3d at 1103. 
65 Id. at 1106. 
66 See id. at 1108. 
67 Id. at 1107. 
68 83 F.3d at 1070, 1074. 
69 Id. at 1072. 
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tion requirement imposed by Section 7 of the ESA.70 The Ninth Circuit 
held, however, that there is no agency action where an agency “lacks 
the discretion to influence the private action” and therefore the proffer 
of suggestions constituted mere informal advice that does not trigger 
the consultation requirement.71 The court reasoned that to mandate 
the “burdensome” requirements of Section 7 when the agency is re-
sponding to a party seeking advice would be a disincentive to provide 
such advice, and an impermissible detriment to the protection of the 
endangered species.72 
 Relying on similar reasoning in 2012, the Ninth Circuit ruled in 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Salazar that consultation is not re-
quired where an agency’s discretion is so limited that it does not trigger 
the provisions of the ESA.73 In Salazar, various environmental groups 
challenged the Bureau’s renewal of forty-one water contracts without 
consultation in 2004 and 2005, citing harm to the delta smelt popula-
tion of the region.74 The Bureau argued that it lacked discretion be-
cause it was statutorily required to renew requested senior water rights 
contracts.75 In affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
for defendant, the Ninth Circuit held that the renewal of the water de-
livery contracts was automatic based on the terms of the original con-
tracts and therefore there was no opportunity for negotiation.76 With-
out the ability to negotiate, the court ruled that the Bureau lacked 
sufficient discretion and was thus not bound by the consultation re-
quirements of the ESA.77 
III. Analysis 
 In Karuk Tribe of California v. United States Forest Service, the Ninth 
Circuit held that there was agency action under Section 7 of the Endan-
                                                                                                                      
70 Id. at 1073. 
71 Id. at 1074 (citing Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509, 1511 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(finding that BLM’s issuance of an “approval” letter for a road right-of-way was not an “au-
thorization” or affirmative act that would trigger consultation where the letter specifically 
expressed the agency’s limited discretion)). 
72 Id. at 1074–75. 
73 686 F.3d at 1099. 
74 Id. at 1095. 
75 Id. at 1099. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. But see id. at 1105 (Paez, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the water delivery con-
tracts provided flexibility in that the terms and conditions of the renewal contracts must be 
“mutually agreeable” and that therefore there was in fact sufficient discretion available to 
the agency). 
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gered Species Act (ESA).78 The court found that the U.S. Forest Service 
(“Forest Service”) affirmatively acted while retaining discretion by au-
thorizing mining activities under specified protective criteria without 
prior consultation to the appropriate wildlife service.79 Moreover, the 
activities approved under the Notices of Intent (NOI) sufficiently satis-
fied the “may affect” standard to trigger the duty to consult.80 
 In reaching its determination, the court interpreted the chosen 
options of the Forest Service regulations, in either permitting the po-
tential miner to operate after proffer of a NOI or requiring that miner 
to submit a Plan of Operations (“Plan”), to be affirmative acts.81 Distin-
guishing the circumstances from Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, where the 
court found no duty to consult, the Ninth Circuit held that the Forest 
Service’s approval of four NOIs constituted action that went beyond 
informal advice.82 Moreover, the court found that the Forest Service 
exercised discretion in three distinct ways: the formulation of criteria 
for the protection of the coho salmon habitat, the refusal of a NOI 
proposed by the New 49ers, and the application of different criteria 
when evaluating a proposed NOI in different districts of the Klamath 
National Forest.83 Therefore, because such discretion could, and was in 
fact designed to, benefit the coho salmon, the Forest Service exercised 
sufficient discretionary agency action to trigger the consultation re-
quirement.84 
 The dissent argued that the majority decision transforms the NOI 
from its intended role as an information-gathering tool to an automatic 
trigger requiring consultation.85 Likening the facts of Karuk to the 1996 
case Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, the dissent reasoned that the NOI is an 
informal proffer of advice prior to agency action that allows miners to 
“change their plans in a way that will avoid causing significant surface 
resource disturbances.”86 Furthermore, the dissent reasoned that the 
majority position could waste time and resources.87 
 Six weeks after the court’s decision in Karuk, the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied a narrow definition of agency action in National Resources Defense 
                                                                                                                      
78 See 681 F.3d 1006, 1030 (9th Cir. 2012). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1029. 
81 Id. at 1022. 
82 See id. at 1021; Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 1996). 
83 Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1025–26. 
84 See id. at 1027. 
85 See id. at 1034 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
86 Id. at 1036, 1038. 
87 See id. at 1034. 
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Council v. Salazar.88 Given the range of decisions emerging from the 
Ninth Circuit regarding agency action, an agency’s compliance with the 
requirements of Section 7 of the ESA appears to be highly fact-specific 
and has left the court without a consistent body of law.89 To avoid rely-
ing on an artificial distinction between action and inaction, the Ninth 
Circuit should consistently apply a broad definition of agency action.90 
In addition to providing the court with necessary guidance, doing so 
conforms to circuit precedent.91 
 The Ninth Circuit has appropriately found sufficient discretionary 
agency action in cases similar to Karuk.92 In Turtle Island, longline fish-
ermen were required to obtain a permit from the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) prior to fishing.93 Similarly in Karuk, miners 
are required to submit a NOI in instances where operations may cause 
significant disturbances to endangered species or critical habitat.94 In 
both circumstances, the agency is left with one of two options: the 
agency can approve the application and thereby allow the respective 
activity to commence, or the agency can deny the application.95 In the 
case of Karuk, following the denial of a NOI, the miner must submit a 
Plan if the District Ranger determines that the operation will likely 
cause disruption of surface resources.96 Therefore, just as with the 
NMFS in Turtle Island, accepting or denying NOIs affords the Forest 
Service significant discretion to manage the parks’ endangered species, 
including the coho salmon, as intended.97 
 In utilizing that discretion, even a minimal action distinguishes the 
agency from a passive onlooker.98 In Karuk, the Ninth Circuit noted 
that had the District Ranger consulted with the U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service or the NMFS instead of looking to internal biologists, the con-
                                                                                                                      
88 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Salazar, 686 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2012); Karuk, 
681 F.3d at 1130. 
89 See The Ninth Circuit Interprets “Agency Action” Under the Endangered Species Act—Again, 
Perkins Coie ( July 25, 2012), http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/12_07_EER%20_ 
Update_9th_Circ_Interp_Agcy_Act_Under_Endangered_Species_Act_Again.pdf. 
90 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1024; Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat’l Marine Fish-
eries Serv., 340 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2003); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 
F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 1998). 
91 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1024; Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 974; Houston, 146 F.3d at 1127. 
92 See Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 977; Houston, 146 F.3d at 1126. 
93 340 F.3d at 974. 
94 681 F.3d at 1013. 
95 See id.; Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 974. 
96 681 F.3d at 1013. 
97 See id. at 1013, 1025; Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 974. 
98 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1025; Doremus, supra note 20. 
2013] KARUK and ESA Section 7 97 
sultation requirement would have been met.99 Since the consultation 
requirement was not met, despite an affirmative act, the Forest Service 
acted in a similar fashion to the Bureau of Reclamation (“Bureau”) in 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Houston, where the Bureau both re-
tained sufficient discretion and affirmatively acted by negotiating and 
executing contracts.100 In both Karuk and Houston, because there was 
an affirmative act, the Ninth Circuit distinguished agencies from pas-
sive onlookers and required consultation with the appropriate outside 
authorities.101 
 If the agency does not act in any way, or has such limited discretion 
that it cannot protect the endangered species or habitat, there is no 
duty to consult.102 In a situation such as in Western Watersheds Project v. 
Matejko, where the Bureau of Land Management did not stop private 
parties with a vested right from diverting waterways on public land, re-
quiring the agency to consult could be seen as a waste of resources.103 
Such a distinction, however, is in practice a meaningless artificial con-
struct that leads to inconsistent results.104 
 For example, where an agency has already acted, but it is unclear 
whether that agency has retained sufficient discretion to ensure protec-
tion of the endangered species, applying an unduly narrow definition 
of agency action is improper.105 The Salazar decision exemplifies the 
inconsistency emerging from the Ninth Circuit and seems to be out of 
line with circuit precedent.106 The facts of Houston align almost exactly 
with those in Salazar: the Bureau renewed existing water contracts 
without consulting the NMFS.107 Nevertheless, whereas the Houston 
court ruled that the Bureau had not met its obligations under the ESA, 
the Salazar court inexplicably held that the agency lacked sufficient dis-
cretion and was thus not bound by the ESA.108 Under Salazar’s reason-
                                                                                                                      
99 681 F.3d at 1029–30. 
100 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1027; Houston, 146 F.3d at 1125–26. 
101 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1027; Houston, 146 F.3d at 1125–26; Doremus, supra note 20. 
102 See W. Watersheds Project v. Matejko, 468 F.3d 1099, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006); Sierra 
Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1511–12 (9th Cir. 1995). 
103 See 468 F.3d at 1110; see also Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1034 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
104 See infra notes 105–109 and accompanying text. 
105 See Salazar, 686 F.3d at 1099 (finding no duty to consult where an agency’s discre-
tion is limited by contract terms). 
106 Compare 686 F.3d at 1099, with Houston, 146 F.3d at 1126–27. 
107 Salazar, 686 F.3d at 1095; Houston, 146 F.3d at 1124. 
108 See Salazar, 686 F.3d at 1099 (finding “the Bureau’s renewal of the Settlement Con-
tracts is not subject to . . . the ESA because its action is not a ‘discretionary action’”); Hous-
ton, 146 F.3d at 1125 (“Clearly, negotiating and executing contracts is ‘agency action.’”). 
Before Salazar, a contract renewal was assumed to be an agency action. 
98 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:E. Supp. 
ing, the Forest Service in Karuk might have been able to ignore a NOI 
submitted by a potential miner and take no further action, which would 
be contrary to the purposes of the ESA.109 
 The broad standard expounded in Karuk reflects congressional in-
tent and should be adopted in future cases to avoid artificially construct-
ing a distinction between action and inaction.110 The ESA was created to 
protect endangered species and critical habitat despite the potential 
drawbacks on industry.111 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill discussed Section 7 of the ESA, explaining that, “Con-
gress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear 
that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered spe-
cies the highest of priorities.”112 By requiring an agency to seek expert 
consultation, the agency is statutorily required to consider alternatives 
that ensure protection of the endangered species.113 Though such a 
broad interpretation could arguably delay a project by requiring the 
agency to consult the proper authority,114 that mechanism best serves 
the interests of the environment while preserving the private right to 
use the land, thereby balancing agency discretion and environmental 
protection.115 
 Furthermore, as evidenced by the range of decisions resulting 
from similar facts, a finding of sufficient discretion is often arbitrary 
and unpredictable.116 This possibility frustrates the purposes of the ESA 
and the consultation requirement, which aim to stimulate reasonable 
and prudent alternatives.117 Even if there is no better alternative, the 
process was designed to at least require some sort of due diligence on 
the part of the agency to determine whether the agency could influence 
a private activity to protect the endangered species or habitat.118 Apply-
ing a narrow interpretation of agency action based on a distinction be-
                                                                                                                      
109 See Salazar, 686 F.3d at 1099; Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1020. 
110 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1020. 
111 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 165, 194 (1978) (finding in favor of the 
protection of the endangered snail darter in conformance with the ESA despite an esti-
mated economic loss of fifty-three million dollars). 
112 Id. at 194. 
113 Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1020, 1024; Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 974. 
114 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1039 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“The informal Notice of Intent 
process allows projects to proceed within a few weeks. In contrast, ESA interagency consul-
tation requires a formal biological assessment and conferences, and can delay projects for 
months or years.”). 
115 See Doremus, supra note 20. 
116 Compare Salazar, 686 F.3d at 1099, with Houston, 146 F.3d at 1126–27. 
117 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1020; Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 974. 
118 See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1025; Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 977. 
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tween action and inaction has great potential to ignore the ESA’s pur-
pose, allow for inconsistency, and should be abandoned.119 
Conclusion 
 The Ninth Circuit should begin to consistently apply a broad defi-
nition to “agency action” when evaluating the consultation require-
ments imposed by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. The Su-
preme Court’s decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill provides 
guidance that has been ignored—the ESA was created to force agencies 
to evaluate alternatives to proposed actions, with the balance tilting in 
favor of the endangered species. By consistently applying the expansive 
definition of agency action as developed in Karuk Tribe of California v. 
United States Forest Service, the Ninth Circuit can restore regulatory pre-
dictability and maintain the statutory right to private action, while pro-
tecting vulnerable endangered species. 
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